



April 4, 2008

The Consequences of Churning

A State-by-State Account of the Toll of Deployments on Frontline Active-Army Units

By Veterans for America's Wounded Warrior Outreach Program

Report Summary

It is commonly known that a very small percentage of the American population has borne a disproportionate burden of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. What is less commonly understood is that our Army's **Brigade Combat Teams (BCT's)** – **a subset of this already small population** – **have been repeatedly sent to the frontlines, enduring high-intensity combat for extended periods with inadequate time at home between tours.**

In a first-of-its-kind report, Veterans for America (VFA) has constructed a detailed picture of our frontline Army units. This report combines into a single document the number of deployments for each BCT, the intensity of their combat, and the dwell time they received.

It is now abundantly clear that the very **Soldiers who have seen the most combat are the ones being deployed over and over.** In less than seven years since the United States was attacked by al Qaeda and slightly over five since the war in Iraq began, four BCT's have been deployed four times. Ten BCT's have been deployed three times, and almost all have served at least twice.

VFA's Wounded Warrior Outreach Program investigators have visited military bases across the country, and we can say with confidence that our deployment policies are having devastating consequences on the health of our troops. This cannot continue. Department of Defense studies prove that with each deployment Soldiers are 60% more likely to develop severe post-combat mental health problems.

Our frontline fighters need rest. Pausing troop withdrawals prevents this.

Veterans for America calls on Congress to demand more humane deployment cycles. There is a limit to how much combat our Soldiers can endure.

VETERANS FOR AMERICA

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After spending 19 of the past 21 months deployed to Iraq and the Middle East on back-to-back tours, he [Col. Rob Baker, Commander, 2nd BCT, 1st Armored Division] recently returned to Baumholder and found himself unable to pick out his youngest daughter in the “Welcome Home” crowd. In the almost two years her father was gone, Julianne Baker, now 12 years old, had grown nearly a foot. “I know the strains that back-to-back deployments can put on a great relationship and a great family. There’s a threshold beyond which people will say, ‘I just can’t give any more...’”¹

James Kitfield, “Army Anxiety,” *The National Journal*

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CREATING A SUSTAINABLE IRAQ WAR DEPLOYMENT POLICY

Far too often when Iraq policy options are discussed, the needs of those who are serving in Iraq and Afghanistan are given insufficient attention. Euphemisms such as “readiness”² and “the U.S. Army is out of balance”³ hide an ugly reality: Crushing deployment cycles risk doing irreparable damage to our Soldiers. America’s elected representatives have a responsibility to pay more attention to the needs of our servicemembers.

When General David Petraeus testifies before Congress on April 8-9, 2008, the voice of our Soldiers must be heard. Rightly so, there are limits on what men and women in uniform can say. This being the case, Veterans for America (VFA) will convey the message that **pausing troop withdrawals will have devastating consequences for our troops, given the great post-combat burden that they are bearing as a result of repeated exposure to high-intensity combat.** The system of care designed to treat post-combat mental health injuries, the most common wounds of our current wars, is inadequate to the task and will be for the foreseeable future. The only step that can ease this burden is more time out of the fight to rest, re-train, and recuperate.

For years, Veterans for America has been working to improve the lives of servicemembers and their families, especially when Soldiers (and Marines) return from the frontlines. Post-combat mental health problems are a consequence of repeated extended tours with high-intensity combat and inadequate dwell time. Our work confirms the findings of a Presidential commission and a number of Department of Defense task forces: psychological injuries

are a signature injury of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. One central fact is often omitted when these injuries are discussed: in many cases, these injuries are preventable, but doing so requires proper management of the military.

High-Intensity Combat

Active-duty Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACR’s), which are the focus of this report, have been at the center of Army operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. High-intensity combat is the norm for these frontline units.⁴ On average, approximately 21 Soldiers have been killed in action (KIA) in Iraq during active-duty BCT deployments. This means that the KIA rate for members of active-duty Army BCT is approximately twice that of all servicemembers deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. In all, more than 42 percent of all U.S. servicemembers killed in action in Iraq and Afghanistan have been members of active-duty Army BCT’s and ACR’s.⁵

Some notable KIA figures for active-duty Army BCT’s:

- During its second Iraq tour, the 1st Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team lost 59 members of its unit, the highest number of fatalities of any Army Brigade Combat Team deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan.
- With 47 KIA—more than twice the average fatality rate for active-duty Army’s BCTs in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—the 2nd BCT/101st Airborne’s second tour was among the most deadly for U.S. Soldiers deployed to Iraq. About one year later, the BCT was back in Iraq.
- BCT’s based in Texas have been hit especially hard:

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- Seven of the eight BCTs based in Texas have experienced at least one tour in which the unit suffered fatalities above the active-duty Army BCT average of approximately 21 fatalities per Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) tour.
- Based on VFA's best estimate, several Texas BCTs experienced dramatically higher fatality rates: the 3rd BCT/1st Cavalry Division lost 56 Soldiers during its most recent tour, 167 percent above the average, and the 1st BCT/4th Infantry Division lost 57 Soldiers from December 2005 to December 2006, 171 percent above the average.
- Altogether, Fort Hood has lost more Soldiers than any other American military installation: 436 in the past five years.⁶
- The 3rd BCT/82nd Airborne's last tour of Iraq was the most deadly of any by the 82nd Airborne Division, suffering fatalities more than 200 percent above the 21 fatality average for an active BCT deployment to Iraq.
- Recently, the 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum announced that more than 100 Soldiers had been killed in action in Iraq.

According to multiple Army-led Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) reports, Soldiers who survive high-intensity combat are much more likely to have post-combat mental health problems than those who have faced low-intensity or medium-intensity combat. MHAT IV found that 28 percent of Soldiers who had experienced high-intensity combat screened positive for acute stress (i.e., Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, PTSD). This is more than three times the PTSD rate for those who had seen low-intensity combat and more than twice the rate for those who had seen medium-intensity combat.⁷

Multiple Deployments

Repeated deployments combined with the above mentioned high intensity combat have taken an incredible toll on active component BCT's. With a war that has lasted much longer than expected, many Soldiers have found that their contract obliges them to return to Iraq and Afghanistan multiple times. As this report demonstrates, every active-duty BCT has deployed on average at least twice. Ten BCTs have deployed three times, and four BCTs have deployed four times.⁸

In October 2007, the Soldiers of the 2nd BCT of the 10th Mountain Division completed their fourth tour since 9/11. Of the 41 BCTs and three Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACR's) in the active-duty Army, the 2nd BCT of the 10th Mountain Division is the most heavily deployed BCT in the force.⁹

The 3rd BCT of the 101st Airborne Division contains the greatest number of Soldiers who have been deployed multiple times since 9/11. When it began its fourth tour, this one likely to last 15 months, more than half of the 3,500 members of the BCT were starting their fourth deployment.¹⁰

The mental health impact of multiple tours is substantial. MHAT V contains a number of findings that should give pause when considering U.S. troop levels in Iraq. MHAT V, which was released in early 2008, found the likelihood of non-commissioned officers (NCO's) having a mental health problem rose by 55% between the first and second deployment. The rate of such problems rose more than 45% for troops between their second deployment and their third or fourth deployment.¹¹ Most striking is the comparison of NCO's on the first tours to NCO's on their third or fourth tour. MHAT V found that the likelihood of NCO's having a mental health problem rose more than 125% between the first

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and third/fourth deployment. (For those who think that service in Afghanistan places considerably less stress on Soldiers deployed there, another finding from MHAT V bears noting; in Afghanistan in 2007, NCO's who were multiple deployers were 45 percent more likely to have mental health problems than NCO's who were on their first deployment.¹²) In the words of a senior official at Fort Hood who spoke off the record with VFA, "after three or four tours, Soldiers begin to unravel."

While many highlight the importance of increasing end strength and the relief that could provide Soldiers, it bears remembering that end strength additions will not be finalized until 2010¹³—more than a year into the next president's administration—and after tens of thousands of Soldiers have been deployed and redeployed again.

Inadequate Dwell Time

Another common problem described in this report is inadequate dwell time—time at home between deployments to rest, recuperate, reconnect with family, integrate new unit members, train, and prepare to deploy again, if necessary. Before the Iraq war, the Army aimed for Soldiers to spend twice as much time at home as deployed. At present, the Army is not able to maintain a 1:1 dwell to deployed ratio,¹⁴ much less a 2:1 ratio. If current trends continue, Army leaders predict it will take years to get back to a 2:1 dwell to deployed ratio.

Here are some of the most glaring examples of inadequate dwell time:

- With only nine months at home between its first and second deployments to Iraq, the 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division from Fort Riley, Kansas, experienced one of the shortest dwell-time periods of any unit in the Army.
- The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment based at Fort Hood, Texas, had less than a year of dwell time between its first and second tours in Iraq.
- The 4th BCT, 10th Mountain Division was activated in January 2005. It is currently on its second deployment of its three-year history. There were nine months dwell for new unit, after 15 months deployed, between its first and second tours.
- Some Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (Fort Drum) had six months dwell time between its second and third post-9/11 deployments.

Inadequate dwell time is directly correlated with higher rates of post-combat mental health problems. MHAT V listed as one of its key overall recommendations: "Ensure adequate dwell-time between deployments."¹⁵ According to MHAT V, which included reports on focus group discussions in late 2007 with troops in Iraq and Afghanistan:

"There was...total consensus among all focus groups affected by the tour extension that the Army must lock in an equal amount of dwell time. In four of the focus groups, this worry was brought up spontaneously by Soldiers. It was the feeling of the focus group interviewers that many Soldiers were very anxious and concerned that the Army would not give them their equal dwell time, and by not doing so, *would break a psychological contract with them* (emphasis added)."¹⁶

Fortunately, some high-level Army commanders have been increasingly vocal about the imperative of increasing dwell time now. In October 2007, Maj. Gen. Benjamin "Randy" Mixon, commanding general of the 25th Infantry Division as well as commander, Multinational Division-North in Iraq stated: "We've got to take a look at the multiple

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rotations that we're requiring of our great Soldiers and Marines in particular, but really the whole force... We've got people that are now in their second and third rotation [to Iraq]... We're going to have to increase the time people spend back home and reduce the amount of force over here—that's just the strategic reality."¹⁷

Veterans for America's work confirms—as Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently stated—that our troops are "tired."¹⁸ They—and their families—need more time between tours to rest and recuperate.

Extended Tours, Moving the Goalpost

Fifteen month tours are profoundly devastating for our troops. For many in the public, this issue first came to the fore in April 2007 when Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced that the standard tour for those in the Army deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan would increase from 12 months to 15 months. In reality, our troops had been serving 15-month tours long before this announcement and, oftentimes, they were not notified until days before they were meant to return home. For many Soldiers and their families, considerable damage had already been done by earlier tour extensions. Here are some of the most striking tour extensions endured by frontline Army units:

- In 2006, after 380 Soldiers had already returned to Alaska, members of the 172nd SBCT (now the 1st BCT/25th Infantry Division) were informed that their tour had been extended to sixteen months.¹⁹
- The 1st BCT/3d Infantry Division's first tour of Iraq was extended by three months as the chaos in Iraq spread in the summer of 2003. Soldiers from the 1st BCT were packed in Kuwait, and set to return home within hours, when there were instructed to return to Iraq.²⁰
- In 2004, the 1st Armored Division's aviation brigade was twice packed in Kuwait, and set to return to Germany, when their Iraq tour was extended.²¹
- Members of the 3rd BCT/10th MTN were notified in January 2007, days before coming home, that their tour in Afghanistan had been extended four months.²²
- The 2nd BCT/1st Cavalry Division planned on leaving Iraq at the end of October 2004, but had its tour extended until the end of December 2004. As their departure date approached, the Defense Department announced that their tour had been extended again to March 2005, to help secure the January 2005 Iraqi elections.
- The 2nd BCT/1st Armored Division's first tour of Iraq was scheduled to end in April 2004, but was extended three months after the Sunni insurgency flared around Baghdad. During its extended deployment, eight Soldiers from the 2nd BCT were killed by a car bomb on April 29, while clearing a highway south of Baghdad of IEDs.²³
- The 2nd BCT/25th Infantry Division was told that its first tour to Iraq had been extended sixty days on December 2, 2004.
- 2nd BCT/1st Cavalry Division (Fort Hood) had its first tour to Iraq extended twice.
- According to the 1st Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (Schweinfurt, Germany) website, the unit's second tour of Iraq "was to have ended on July 27, 2006, but the U.S. Army unexpectedly extended its deployment until the end of November 2006."²⁴
- In April 2004, the Pentagon announced that the 2nd ACR's tour would be extended 90 days, from 12 months to 15 months.

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According to MHAT V and Soldiers that VFA has worked with, this has had a dispiriting effect on the morale of those deployed. It has also been very difficult for families waiting for their Soldiers to return home to have the goalpost suddenly moved. In the words of MHAT V, "Among those in units affected by the tour extension while already deployed, there was near total consensus among focus group interviewees that the tour extensions had placed a burden on everyone: themselves, their colleagues, Soldiers, leaders and on their families."²⁵

Positive Signs from Leadership Creates an Opportunity for Congress

Veterans for America's Wounded Warrior Outreach Program is greatly encouraged that some leading military officials have made statements recently that indicate a recognition of the harm being done to our Soldiers by repeated tours with high-intensity combat, inadequate dwell time, and insufficient post-combat assistance. Shortly after becoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen embarked on a listening tour across the U.S. military. After hearing the reality of more than six years of war, he began to make statements showing his recognition of the scope of the problems our servicemembers are facing, especially the post-combat mental health challenges. In his first public address, Admiral Mullen said: "...PTSD...is an issue of great concern to me. I am old enough to have been in Vietnam and remember what we did and didn't do then...I still think there is a great deal we don't know...I will make it very visible in my time as Chairman..."²⁶

Last year, General George W. Casey, Jr., Chief of Staff of the Army, stated: "...we [are not] able to provide an acceptable tempo of deployments

to sustain our Soldiers and Families for the long haul."²⁷ Later, he noted: "People aren't designed to be exposed to the horrors of combat repeatedly, and it wears on them...There's no question about that."²⁸ General Casey has been adamant about the need for the Army to return to a 1:1 to dwell time to deployed time ratio as soon as possible. The need to return to a 2:1 ratio dwell to deployed time has also been reinforced by Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, the former commander of Multinational Corps Iraq.

Veterans for America calls upon Members of Congress to help these Army leaders, as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as they work to improve the lives of those who are currently deployed to Iraq, as well as those who will be deployed soon. Congress should quickly agree on a strong bipartisan basis that the members of the active-Army's BCT's have done honorable service for our country and that they deserve the opportunity to rest and recuperate. They deserve a change in deployment cycles. Otherwise, Congress risks being complicit in knowingly compounding the wounds of war and, possibly, doing irreparable harm to hundreds of thousands of Soldiers and their families.

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Note regarding fatality figures:

As of March 1, 2008, the total number of active-duty Army fatalities from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was 2,573. VFA mourns the death of these servicemembers and all others who have served in our recent wars, as well as earlier wars.

In this report, VFA has limited its examination to the 1,876 fatalities from active-duty Army Brigade Combat Teams and Armored Cavalry Regiments, as of that date. These figures are the best open-source method of gauging the intensity of combat experienced by individual units. Due to the Army's transition to a modular force, which has entailed, among other steps, relocating and reflagging units, and the difficulty of consolidating information from a wide range of open sources, the fatality figures in this report are VFA's best estimate of Brigade Combat Team and Armored Cavalry Regiment fatalities. There may be some variance between the fatality figures in this report and reports from other sources.

ALASKA

The fatality figures in this report are VFA's best estimate.

Both Brigade Combat Teams (BCT's) stationed in Alaska have faced tours beyond the 12-month norm. During the 4th BCT/25th Infantry Division's 15-month tour in Iraq, it suffered fatalities greater than 150% above the 21 fatality average for an active BCT deployment to Iraq. The 172nd SBCT (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), now the 1st BCT/25th Infantry Division, originally expected to deploy for one year but was informed that its tour had been extended to 16 months after 380 of its Soldiers had already returned to Alaska.

25th Infantry Division, 4th Brigade Combat Team (Fort Richardson)

- Tour:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), October 2006 to December 2007: 56 fatalities
 - 15-month tour
- The 4th BCT was originally scheduled to return to Fort Richardson in late September 2007 after a tour of 12 months. In April 2007, however, its tour was extended to 15 months.
- On January 20, 2007, men dressed as American Soldiers gained access to a government compound in Karbala and attacked a unit of the 4th BCT. Four American Soldiers lost their lives.²⁹
- The 4th BCT is expected to deploy to Afghanistan in February 2009.

172nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team/25th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade Combat Team (Fort Wainwright)

- Tour:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), August 2005 to December 2006: 24 fatalities
 - 16-month tour
- The 172nd SBCT reflagged as the 1st BCT/25th Infantry Division upon its return from Iraq.
- In July 2006, the unit's tour was extended by four months. Almost 400 Soldiers had already arrived in Alaska and were ordered to return to Iraq.³⁰

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CALIFORNIA

The fatality figures in this report are VFA's best estimate.

In 2004, the Pentagon took the unusual step of deploying the 11th ACR, one of the Army's elite Opposing Force (OPFOR) training units, to Iraq. While deployed, a unit from the Nevada National Guard filled its position at the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, while other units trained for their deployments close to their home stations.

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Fort Irwin)

- Tour:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), December 2004 to January 2006: 13 fatalities
 - 13-month tour
- The 11th ACR serves as the opposing force (OPFOR) at the NTC, where other units come to train and prepare for deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army faced some criticism for deploying one of the Army's elite training units. While the 11th ACR was deployed, the 1st Squadron/221st Cavalry Regiment of the Nevada National Guard acted as the NTC's OPFOR; other units, such as the 82nd Airborne Division, trained for their upcoming deployments close to home.³¹

COLORADO

The fatality figures in this report are VFA's best estimate.

The two Brigade Combat Teams currently stationed at Fort Carson have been deeply involved in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The deployment of the 2nd BCT/2nd Infantry Division from Korea to Iraq marked the first time in over 50 years that

a unit of the 2nd Infantry Division had deployed directly to a combat zone outside the Korean Theater.³² Now based in Colorado, this unit has suffered more fatalities than any other Fort Carson unit. During its first and second tours, it suffered fatality rates 200% and over 100%, respectively, above the average tour fatality level for active-duty Army BCTs.

The 3rd BCT/4th Infantry Division, currently on its third tour in Iraq, faced controversy early this year when the Denver Post revealed that more than 52 Soldiers were deployed despite having medical profiles that made them non-deployable. According to e-mails obtained by the Post, these deployments were necessary because the brigade had "been having issues with reaching deployable strength."

2nd Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (Fort Carson)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), August 2004 to August 2005: 64 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), October 2006 to January 2008: 45 fatalities
 - 15-month tour
- When the 2nd BCT/2nd Infantry Division was deployed to Iraq in August 2004, it was based in South Korea. It is now based at Fort Carson.
- Maj. Gen. Mark Graham, Fort Carson post commander, as quoted before the 2nd BCT returned from its second deployment: "PTSD is like a hurricane. If you're in the path, it doesn't matter who you are, it hits you."³³

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4th Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (Fort Carson)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), March 2003 to March 2004: 22 fatalities
 - 12-month deployment
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), December 2005 to December 2006: 39 fatalities
 - 12-month deployment

4th Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade Combat Team (Fort Carson)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), April 2003 to April 2004: 8 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), November 2005 to November 2006: 20 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), January 2008 to Present: 6 fatalities
 - 4 months served of estimated 15 months
- On January 17, 2008, the *Denver Post* reported that at least 52 Soldiers from the 3rd BCT had been deployed to Iraq despite having medical profiles that made them ineligible for deployment because the brigade had “been having issues with reaching deployable strength.” Maj. Gen. Mark Graham, Fort Carson’s commander, said on March 6, 2008, that an internal investigation had found that the process designed to screen Soldiers before deployment, Soldier Readiness

Processing (SRP), was sound; on March 20, 2008, Maj. Gen. Jeffrey Hammond, commander of the 4th Infantry Division, claimed responsibility, saying, “I made those mistakes in deploying those Soldiers.”³⁴

GEORGIA

The fatality figures in this report are VFA’s best estimate.

The Third Infantry Division stationed in Georgia was deployed first in 2002 to Kuwait to spearhead the invasion of Iraq and again in January 2005. Its 1st, 2nd, and 3rd BCTs are scheduled to be returned to the United States over the next few months.

3rd Infantry Division, 1st Brigade Combat Team (Fort Stewart)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), January 2003 to August 2003: 18 fatalities
 - 8-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), January 2005 to January 2006: 31 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), February 2007 to Present: 12 fatalities
 - 14 months served of estimated 15 months
- The 1st BCT’s first tour of Iraq was extended three months as the chaos in Iraq spread in the summer of 2003. Soldiers from the 1st BCT were packed in Kuwait and set to return home within hours when there were instructed to return to Iraq.³⁵

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3rd Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (Fort Stewart)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), September 2002 to August 2003: 7 fatalities
 - 13-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), January 2005 to January 2006: 18 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), May 2007 to Present: 24 fatalities
 - 11 months served of estimated 15 months
- The 2nd BCT's first tour of Iraq was notable for its lead in the armored "Thunder Run" through Baghdad in early April 2003. When its tour was extended a second time, Spc. Clinton Deitz, while being interviewed by ABC News, stated: "If Donald Rumsfeld was here, I'd ask him for his resignation."³⁶

3rd Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade Combat Team (Fort Benning)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), March 2002 to September 2002: 0 fatalities
 - 5-month tour
 - ****3-month dwell time****
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), January 2003 to July 2003: 4 fatalities
 - 7-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), January 2005 to January 2006: 31 fatalities
 - 12-month tour

- Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), March 2007 to Present: 30 fatalities
 - 13 months served of estimated 15 months

- The 3rd BCT's first tour of Iraq was also notable for its lead in the armored 'Thunder Run' of Baghdad in April 2003, which hurried the fall of Saddam Hussein.

3rd Infantry Division, 4th Brigade Combat Team (Fort Stewart)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), January 2005 to January 2006: 14 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - OIF, September 2007 to Present: 2 fatalities
 - 7 months served of estimated 15 months
- The 3rd Infantry Division's "Vanguard Brigade" was the first brigade formed from the Army's modularity transformation plan in 2004.
- During its current deployment to Iraq, the 4th BCT has been engaged in counterinsurgency operations in the "belts" surrounding Baghdad, with increased levels of violence accompanied by close air support.³⁷

HAWAII

The fatality figures in this report are VFA's best estimate.

The Brigade Combat Teams based in Hawaii have felt the strain of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)). The 2nd BCT/25th Infantry

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Division was informed that its first tour to Iraq had been extended 60 days on December 2, 2004, one month before it was scheduled to return. The 3rd BCT/25th Infantry Division has suffered higher-than-average casualties, both during its tour in Afghanistan (67% above average) and its tour in Iraq (48% above average). The 25th Infantry Division's commander at the time, Maj. Gen. Randy Mixon, observed as the 3rd BCT was beginning to return home, "[w]e've got people that are now in their second and third rotation [to Iraq]... We're going to have to increase the time people spend back home and reduce the amount of force over here that's just the strategic reality."³⁸

25th Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (Schofield Barracks)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), January 2004 to February 2005: 7 fatalities
 - 13-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), December 2007 to Present: 5 fatalities
 - 4 months served of estimated 15 months
- The 2nd BCT was notified on December 2, 2004, that its first tour would be extended by 60 days in order to assist with securing Iraq during the elections held on January 31, 2005.

25th Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade Combat Team (Schofield Barracks)

- Tours:
 - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), April 2004 to April 2005: 14 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), August 2006 to November 2007: 31 fatalities
 - 15-month tour

- On August 22, 2007, 14 Soldiers, 10 from the 3rd BCT, died when the helicopter that was transporting them crashed in Iraq. It was reported in the Honolulu Advertiser that this "was the greatest single loss of life for the Army this year in Iraq, and the highest single-day fatality total for the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii since the Vietnam War."³⁹

KANSAS

The fatality figures in this report are VFA's best estimate.

The 3rd BDE/1st AD of Fort Riley has experienced one of the shortest dwell-time periods of any unit in the Army. It had only nine months at home between its first and second deployments to Iraq. The 1st BCT/1st Infantry Division suffered casualties 30% higher than the average tour fatality level of active-duty Army BCTs before its role changed to training Military Transition Teams for deployment. The 4th BCT/1st Infantry Division deployed slightly over a year after it activated; the brigade has not finished its first tour and its fatality rate is already 70% above average.

1st Infantry Division, 1st Brigade Combat Team (Fort Riley)

- Tour:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), September 2003 to September 2004: 28 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
- In January 2006, the 1st BCT's mission changed from combat to training Military Transition Teams for deployment. The brigade had been scheduled to deploy to Iraq, but those orders were rescinded in December 2005.

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1st Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (Fort Riley)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), April 2003 to April 2004: 10 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - ****Nine months dwell time between first and second tours****
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), January 2005 to January 2006: 17 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
- In March 2008, the 1st Armored Division's 3rd Brigade Combat Team relocated from Germany to Fort Riley and was reflagged as the 1st Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team.

1st Infantry Division, 4th Brigade Combat Team (Fort Riley)

- Tour:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), February 2007 to Present: 36 fatalities
 - 14 months served of estimated 15 months
- The 4th BCT was activated in January 2006. According to the Associated Press, a new brigade typically takes eighteen to twenty months to prepare for its mission. The 4th BCT deployed a little over a year after it activated.⁴⁰

KENTUCKY

The fatality figures in this report are VFA's best estimate.

The 101st Airborne Division stationed in at Fort Campbell has seen extensive combat in support of war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 1st,

2nd, and 3rd BCTs of the 101st ABN are all scheduled to finish their current 15-month Iraq deployments around December 2008.

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 1st Brigade Combat Team (Fort Campbell)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), March 2003 to February 2004: 9 fatalities
 - 11-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), September 2005 to September 2006: 12 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), September 2007 to Present: 12 fatalities
 - 7 months served of estimated 15 months

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 2nd Brigade Combat Team (Fort Campbell)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), March 2003 to February 2004: 19 fatalities
 - 11-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), September 2005 to September 2006: 47 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), October 2007 to Present: 6 fatalities
 - 6 months served of estimated 15 months

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- During its first deployment to Iraq, the 2nd BCT conducted the six-hour firefight that led to the deaths of Saddam Hussein's sons, Uday and Qusay, in July 2003.⁴¹
- The 2nd BCT's second tour of Iraq was among the most deadly for U.S. Soldiers deployed to Iraq, with more than twice the average fatality rate for active duty Army's BCTs in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 3rd Brigade Combat Team (Fort Campbell)

- Tours:
 - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), January 2002 to July 2002: 0 fatalities
 - 7-month tour
 - ****Seven-month dwell time****
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), March 2003 to February 2004: 7 fatalities
 - 11-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), September 2005 to September 2006: 19 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), September 2007 to Present: 2 fatalities
 - 7 months served of estimated 15 months
- The 3rd BCT was the primary U.S. military blocking force in support of local Afghan forces during Operation Anaconda, the largest light-infantry battle since Vietnam.⁴²
- With its current tour of Iraq, more half of the 3,600 Soldiers of the 3rd BCT have been deployed four times.⁴³

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 4th Brigade Combat Team (Fort Campbell)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), November 2005 to November 2006: 17 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), April 2008 to Present: 0 fatalities
 - First month served of estimated 15 months

LOUISIANA

The fatality figures in this report are VFA's best estimate.

The 4th BCT/10th MTN was activated in January 2005. It is currently on its second deployment in its three-year history.

10th Mountain Division, 4th Brigade Combat Team (Fort Polk)

- Tours:
 - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), January 2006 to February 2007: 3 fatalities
 - 4-month battalion tours
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), November 2007 to Present: 3 fatalities
 - 5 months served of estimated 15 months
- Although the entire 4th BCT initially prepared to deploy to Afghanistan in the spring of 2006, the Pentagon announced that the brigade would instead deploy in battalion-sized forces

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on December 20, 2005, as part of a reduction in troop levels in Afghanistan. The battalions of the 4th BCT took part in Task Forces Patriot, Warrior, and Boar.

NEW YORK

The fatality figures in this report are VFA's best estimate.

U.S. Army Soldiers stationed at Fort Drum have borne a disproportionate share of the fighting in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), with the 10th Mountain Division the most deployed Army division to Iraq and Afghanistan. When it was announced recently that 4,000 U.S. service members had died in Iraq, Fort Drum announced that 108 of them were from its post. The 10th Mountain is scheduled to relieve the 3rd Infantry Division of its command of the Multinational Division Center in Iraq in May.

10th Mountain Division, 1st Brigade Combat Team (Fort Drum)

- Tour:
 - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), August 2003 to May 2004: 5 fatalities
 - 9-month tour
 - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), August 2005 to August 2006: 10 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - ****10 months dwell time****
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), September 2007 to Present: 11 fatalities
 - 7 months served of estimated 15 months

10th Mountain Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (Fort Drum)

- Tours:
 - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), December 2001 to April 2002: 0 fatalities
 - 4-month tour
 - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), May 2003 to December 2003: 2 fatalities
 - 7-month tour
 - ****Fourth Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment had six months dwell time****
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), June 2004 to June 2005: 11 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), August 2006 to November 2007: 41 fatalities
 - 15-month tour
- During its most recent deployment to Iraq, three Soldiers from the 2nd BCT went missing after insurgents overran an Army observation post in May 2007. The remains of one Soldier were recovered, but two remain Missing In Action (MIA): Pvt. Byron Fouty of Waterford, Michigan, and Spc. Alex Jimenez of Lawrence, Massachusetts.
- The 2nd BCT's brigade headquarters and the 4th Battalion, 31st Infantry Regiment deployed to the unit's two tours to Afghanistan, not the entire brigade.
- For a report on the stresses that the multiple deployments have made on the 2nd BCT, see: Veterans for America's Wounded Warrior Outreach Program, *Fort Drum: A Great Burden, Inadequate Assistance*, February 13, 2008.

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10th Mountain Division, 3rd Brigade Combat Team (Fort Drum)

- Tour:
 - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), February 2006 to June 2007: 34 fatalities
 - 16-month tour
- The 3rd BCT was activated as a unit at Fort Drum in late 2004.
- In late January 2007, days before the unit was scheduled to return to Fort Drum, it was notified that its tour had been extended four months.⁴⁴

NORTH CAROLINA

The fatality figures in this report are VFA's best estimate.

The 82nd Airborne Division stationed at Fort Bragg has historically served as the U.S. strategic response force on high-alert, ready for rapid-deployment to trouble spots around the world. Since the run-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), however, it has been deployed in a more routine manner to counter the strains on the Active Army. When all four of its BCTs were deployed in late 2007, it lost its status as providing the Army's rapidly-deployable "Division Ready Brigade" to the 101st Airborne Division.

82nd Airborne Division, 1st Brigade Combat Team (Fort Bragg)

- Tours:
 - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), December 2002 – August 2003: 3 fatalities
 - 8-month tour
 - ****6 months dwell time****
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), January 2004 – April 2004: 8 fatalities
 - 4-month tour

- Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), May 2005 – May 2006: 4 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
- Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), June 2007 – Present: 8 fatalities
 - 9 months served of an estimated 15-month tour

- During its current deployment to Iraq, the 1st BCT has been engaged in counterinsurgency operations, convoy route security, and nation-building in southern Iraq.

82nd Airborne Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (Fort Bragg)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), February 2003 to February 2004: 13 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), January 2007 to Present: 26 fatalities
 - Completing 15-month tour
- The 2nd BCT was the first Army brigade deployed to Iraq in support of the surge strategy announced in late 2006. It was originally scheduled to return in September 2007, but has only begun redeploying to Fort Bragg in late March 2008.⁴⁵

82nd Airborne Division, 3rd Brigade Combat Team (Fort Bragg)

- Tours:
 - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), June 2002 to January 2003: 0 fatalities
 - 7-month tour

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- Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), August 2003 to May 2004: 6 fatalities
 - 9-month tour
- Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), August 2006 to November 2007: 49 fatalities
 - 15-month tour
- The 3rd BCT's last tour of Iraq was the most deadly for the 82nd Airborne Division, with fatalities greater than 200% above the 21 fatality average for an active BCT deployment to Iraq.

82nd Airborne Division, 4th Brigade Combat Team (Fort Bragg)

- Tour:
 - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), January 2007 to Present: 17 fatalities
 - Final month of 15-month tour
- The 4th BCT is scheduled to be relieved of its command in Afghanistan by the 101st Airborne Division's 4th BCT on April 7, 2008.⁴⁶

TEXAS

The fatality figures in this report are VFA's best estimate.

The Brigade Combat Teams of the active-duty Army stationed in Texas have borne a heavy burden fighting in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Seven of the eight BCT's currently based in Texas have experienced at least one tour in which the unit suffered fatalities above the active-duty Army BCT average of approximately 21 fatalities per Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) tour. Several BCTs experienced dramatically higher fatality rates: the 3rd BCT/1st Cavalry Division lost 56 Soldiers during its most recent tour, over 150% above the average, and the 1st BCT/4th Infantry Division lost 57 Soldiers from December 2005 through

December 2006, almost 175% above the average. Altogether, Fort Hood has lost more Soldiers than any other American military installation: 436 in the past five years.

BCTs in Texas have also suffered from lack of dwell time and extended tours. The 3rd ACR had less than a year of dwell time between its first and second tours, and the 2nd BCT/1st Cavalry Division had its first tour to Iraq extended twice. Both tours of the 1st BCT/1st Armored Division were extended.

1st Armored Division, 1st Brigade Combat Team (Fort Bliss)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), May 2003 to July 2004: 23 fatalities
 - 14-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), January 2006 to February 2007: 29 fatalities
 - 13-month tour
- The brigade's first tour was extended by three months in April 2004. When the order was given, some Soldiers from the 1st Armored Division were already in Kuwait awaiting flights to Germany while others were en route. The brigade's second tour was also extended by 45 days.
- The 1st BCT/1st Armored Division relocated to Fort Bliss from Friedberg, Germany, in 2007.

1st Cavalry Division, 1st Brigade Combat Team (Fort Hood)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), March 2004 to March 2005: 38 fatalities
 - 12-month deployment

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- Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), October 2006 to February 2008: 39 fatalities
 - 15-month deployment

1st Cavalry Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (Fort Hood)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), January 2004 to March 2005: 22 fatalities
 - 13-month deployment
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), October 2006 to January 2008: 37 fatalities
 - 15-month deployment
- The 2nd BCT had planned on returning from its first tour at the end of October 2004, but was told on October 4, 2004, that it would complete a one-year tour. It was then scheduled to return around Christmas 2004, but the Defense Department announced on December 2, 2004, that the tour was extended again to March 2005 to help secure the Iraqi elections on January 31, 2005.

1st Cavalry Division, 3rd Brigade Combat Team (Fort Hood)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), April 2004 to April 2005: 19 fatalities
 - 12-month deployment
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), October 2006 to December 2007: 56 fatalities
 - 14-month deployment

- Altogether, units under the 3rd BCT's command suffered 110 fatalities and over 300 seriously wounded between October 2006 and December 2007.⁴⁷

1st Cavalry Division, 4th Brigade Combat Team (Fort Bliss)

- Tour:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), November 2006 to January 2008: 31 fatalities
 - 15-month deployment
- The November 2006 to January 2008 tour was the second Iraq tour for most sub-units of the 4th BCT. The 2/12 Cavalry was previously part of the 1st Cavalry Division, 2nd Brigade, and deployed to Iraq from January 2004 to March 2005. The 2/7 Cavalry and 1/9 Cavalry were previously part of the 1st Cavalry Division, 3rd Brigade, and deployed to Iraq from April 2004 to April 2005.
- The unit reflagged as the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, in March 2008.

3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Fort Hood)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), April 2003 to May 2004: 32 fatalities
 - 13-month deployment
 - ****Unit had less than a year of dwell time between first and second tours****
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), March 2005 to February 2006: 40 fatalities
 - 12-month deployment

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- Forty 3rd ACR Soldiers were sent to Walter Reed Army Medical Center and ten to Brooke Army Medical Center during this deployment.
- Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), December 2007 to Present: 8 fatalities
 - Four months served of estimated 15 months
- Unit relocated to Fort Hood from Fort Carson in July 2006.
- 3rd ACR has approximately 5,000 troops

4th Infantry Division, 1st Brigade Combat Team (Fort Hood)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), March 2003 to March 2004: 9 fatalities
 - 12-month deployment
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), December 2005 to December 2006: 57 fatalities
 - 12-month deployment
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), December 2007 to Present: 0 fatalities
- 4 months served of estimated 15 months
- The 4th Infantry Division's headquarters deployed to Iraq in August 2007, nine months after returning from its previous deployment in December 2006.⁴⁸

4th Infantry Division, 4th Brigade Combat Team (Fort Hood)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), December 2005 to December 2006: 18 fatalities
 - 12-month deployment

- The December 2005 to December 2006 tour was the second Iraq tour for most of the 4th BCT's sub-units. The 1/12 Infantry and 3/67 Armor were previously part of the 3rd BCT and deployed March 2003 to March 2004.
- The unit reflagged as the 4th BCT, 4th Cavalry Division in early March 2008.

WASHINGTON

The fatality figures in this report are VFA's best estimate.

During the 3rd SBCT/2nd Infantry Division's second tour, which was extended 90 days, the brigade suffered fatalities almost 150% above the average per-tour-fatality rate for BCTs deployed to Iraq. The 4th SBCT/2nd Infantry Division (formerly the 2nd ACR), whose first tour was also extended, has currently experienced fatalities over 50% above the average, with an estimated four more months of deployment in Iraq.

2nd Infantry Division, 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team (Fort Lewis)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), November 2003 to November 2004: 20 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), June 2006 to September 2007: 47 fatalities
 - 15-month tour
- The 3rd SBCT was the first Stryker brigade to be deployed to combat.
- The unit's second deployment was extended by 90 days to support the surge in April 2007.

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2nd Infantry Division, 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (Fort Lewis)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), April 2003 to July 2004: 14 fatalities
 - 15-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), April 2007 to Present: 36 fatalities
 - 12 months served of estimated 15 months
- The 4th BCT was activated in June 2006.
- Unit was previously the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment based in Fort Polk, LA.
 - In April 2004, the Pentagon announced that the 2nd ACR's tour would be extended 90 days.
- The 4th BCT could not attend scheduled training at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin in February 2007 because its deployment was moved-up. The unit had to train for deployment at Fort Lewis.

2nd Infantry Division, 5th Stryker Brigade Combat Team (Fort Lewis)

- No tours
- Unit was activated May 2007. It consists mostly of new Soldiers and is predicted to deploy in early 2009.

OCONUS (OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES): GERMANY

The fatality figures in this report are VFA's best estimate.

All BCTs stationed in Germany have suffered fatalities above the 21 fatality average for active BCT deployed to Iraq.

1st Armored Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (Baumholder, Germany)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), April 2003 to July 2004: 24 fatalities
 - 14-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), November 2005 to November 2006: 27 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), March 2008 to Present: 0 fatalities
- First month served of estimated 15 months
- The 2nd BCTs first tour of Iraq was scheduled to end in April 2004, but was extended three months after the Sunni insurgency flared around Baghdad. During its extended deployment, eight Soldiers from the 2nd BCT were killed by a car bomb on April 29, while clearing a highway south of Baghdad of IEDs.⁴⁹
- After spending 19 of 21 months deployed to the Middle East in 2003 and 2004, Col. Rob Baker, Commander of the 2nd BCT, was unable to identify his 12-year old daughter—who had grown a foot—in a 'welcome home' crowd.

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According to Col. Baker: "I know the strains that back-to-back deployments can put on a great relationship and a great family. There's a threshold beyond which people will say, 'I just can't give any more.'"⁵⁰

- In February 2008, Col. Robert White, 2nd BCT commander, told the families of the brigade's Soldiers not to expect a 12-month deployment. "Please plan for a 15-month deployment," White advised.⁵¹

1st Infantry Division, 2nd Brigade Combat Team / 172nd Brigade Combat Team (Schweinfurt, Germany)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), February 2004 to February 2005: 37 fatalities
 - 14-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), June 2006 to December 2007: 59 fatalities
 - 15-month tour
- According to the 2nd BCT's website, the unit's second tour of Iraq "was to have ended on July 27, 2006, but the U.S. Army unexpectedly extended its deployment until the end of November 2006." ("172nd Blackhawk Brigade History," <http://www.2bct.1id.army.mil/Primary%20Sites/index.htm>)
- The 2nd BCT's second tour had the most fatalities of any Army Brigade Combat Team deployed to either Iraq or Afghanistan.
- The unit reflagged as the 172nd Brigade Combat Team in March 2008.

1st Infantry Division, 3rd Brigade Combat Team (Vilseck, Germany)

- Tour:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), February 2004 to March 2005: 28 fatalities
 - 13-month tour
- During its 2004-2005 Iraq tour, Capt. Oscar Estrada, an Army Reserve civil affairs specialist in the 3rd BCT, wrote an op-ed in the *Washington Post* that questioned the Army's tactics in trying to win the hearts and minds of Iraqis. For his efforts, Capt. Estrada was accused by his commanding officer of "aiding the enemy," denied a scheduled two-week rest and recuperation trip to the United States, and assigned to a remote post near the Iranian border.⁵²

2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment (Vilseck, Germany)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), September 2004 to September 2005: 34 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), August 2007 to Present: 18 fatalities
 - 9 months of 15-month tour
- The 1st BCT/25th Infantry Division endured more than 3,000 enemy attacks during its twelve-month tour.⁵³
- On December 21, 2004, 14 American Soldiers were killed when a suicide bomber detonated himself in their mess tent in Mosul, Iraq. Six were from the 1st BCT.⁵⁴

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- In June 2006, the 1st BCT, 25th Infantry Division was reflagged to the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment and moved from Fort Lewis, Washington to Vilseck, Germany. During their current deployment to Iraq, they have been tasked with counterinsurgency operations and detecting and defusing IEDs around the Green Zone in Baghdad.

OCONUS (OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES): ITALY

The fatality figures in this report are VFA's best estimate.

Since the 173rd ABCT began its third deployment, its second to Afghanistan, the unit has already suffered fatalities over 150% above the average per-tour-fatality-rate for BCTs deployed to Afghanistan. Assuming the brigade returns to Italy in August 2008, there are five months remaining in its current tour.

173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (Vicenza, Italy)

- Tours:
 - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), March 2003 to March 2004: 9 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), April 2005 to April 2006: 17 fatalities
 - 12-month tour
 - Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), June 2007 to Present: 30 fatalities
 - 10 months served of estimated 15 months

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ James Kitfield, "Army Anxiety," *The National Journal*, September 17, 2004.
- ² The Honorable Pete Geren, Secretary of the Army, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 26, 2008.
- ³ General George Casey, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, Testimony before the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Defense, March 12, 2008.
- ⁴ In addition to 41 BCT's, there are three Armored Cavalry Regiments (ACR) in the active component of the U.S. Army. While this report will refer primarily to the needs of BCT's, ACR's have also been frequently deployed and have been at the center of the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- ⁵ Fatality figures in this report are derived from two primary sources: Department of Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom: Military Deaths from October 1, 2001 by Name as of March 1, 2008, http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/oef_list_of_names.pdf; Department of Defense, Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Deaths from March 19, 2003 by Name as of March 1, 2008, http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/oef_list_of_names.pdf; VFA research.
- ⁶ Source: Fort Hood suffers largest loss of life in Iraq War, "KCEN-TV (Temple, TX), March 24, 2008.
- ⁷ Office of the Surgeon, Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and Office of the Surgeon General, U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM), "Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) IV, Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07, Final Report," November 19, 2006, www.armymedicine.army.mil/news/mhat/mhat_iv/MHAT_IV_Report_17NOV06.pdf, p. 21. According to MHAT IV, "acute stress" is synonymous with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, MHAT IV, p. 19.
- ⁸ 44 Army frontline units (i.e., BCT's and ACR's) have deployed a total of 102 times to Iraq and Afghanistan.
- ⁹ For the full deployment history of the 2nd BCT/10th Mountain Division, see p. 7. of this report.
- ¹⁰ Sgt. 1st Class Kerensa Hardy, "NEWS RELEASE: Rakkasans officially take reins from Commandos," *10th Mountain News Releases and Advisories*, November 2, 2007; for the full deployment history of the 3rd BCT/101st Airborne Division, see p. 7. of this report.
- ¹¹ MHAT V, p. 46.
- ¹² MHAT V, p. 169.
- ¹³ U.S. Army, "Army Posture Statement: 2008," February 2008.
- ¹⁴ The current standard Army deployment length for BCT's is 15 months and 12 months at home.
- ¹⁵ MHAT V, p. 5.
- ¹⁶ MHAT V, p. 62.
- ¹⁷ William Cole, "Schofield boss worries about strain," *Honolulu Advertiser*, October 4, 2007.
- ¹⁸ "First Public Address by Admiral Mike Mullen, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," October 25, 2007, accessed at: <http://www.cnas.org/en/cev/?17>.
- ¹⁹ Lisa Demer, "Stryker team learns its tour will last longer: Soldiers have been gone for a year," *Anchorage Daily News*, July 28, 2006.
- ²⁰ Michael Gordon, "Fear of Baghdad Unrest Prompts a Halt in Sending Troops Home," *New York Times*, May 15, 2003.
- ²¹ Gina Cavallaro and M. Scott Mahaskey, "Homeward bound, again," *Army Times*, July 26, 2004.
- ²² John Kifner, "Last-Minute Extension in Afghanistan for Unit Whose Bags Were Packed," *New York Times*, February 16, 2007.
- ²³ Jim Krane, "General Says Army's 1st Armored Division Will Leave Iraq in July," *Associated Press*, June 11, 2004; and Gina Cavallaro, "Charlie Battery's Comeback," *Army Times*, June 14, 2004.
- ²⁴ "172nd Blackhawk Brigade History," <http://www.2bct.1id.army.mil/Primary%20Sites/index.htm>.
- ²⁵ MHAT V, p. 61.
- ²⁶ "First Public Address by Admiral Mike Mullen, USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," October 25, 2007, accessed at: <http://www.cnas.org/en/cev/?17>, pp. 16-17.
- ²⁷ Gen. George Casey, "Army Chief of Staff's Remarks at the National Press Club," August 14, 2007.
- ²⁸ Tom Vanden Brook, "War-weary troops pushed to limits," *USA Today*, February 20, 2008, p. A5.
- ²⁹ Richard Mauer, "Death by Treachery: While Fort Rich troops chatted with family, their Iraqi allies melted away as terrorists in disguise entered the Karbala compound," *Anchorage Daily News*, July 15, 2007.

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- ³⁰ Lisa Demer, "Stryker team learns its tour will last longer: Soldiers have been gone for a year," *Anchorage Daily News*, July 28, 2006.
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