

THE G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AGAINST THE SPREAD OF WEAPONS AND MATERIALS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

I. The Issue

In January 2001, the bipartisan Baker-Cutler Task Force concluded that “the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-useable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.”¹ In order to address this threat, the Task Force recommended that approximately \$30 billion be devoted to reducing the threat of possible proliferation of Russian nuclear weapons and materials over the next eight to ten years.

Russia possesses 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons outside the United States, but is unable to fully account for, or adequately secure, this vast nuclear stockpile. Furthermore, Russia expends only a fraction (about 3.3 percent) of the resources the U.S. devotes annually to ensuring its nuclear weapons do not proliferate. A recent report by nuclear specialists Matthew Bunn and Anthony Weir faulted the security of Russian nuclear arsenal facilities, stating, “Security in many cases falls far short of what is needed.”² In addition, Russia has thousands of tactical nuclear weapons that exist in numbers and locations of which the United States is unaware. These weapons, because of their relatively small size and greater portability, are highly desirable to terrorist groups or hostile nations. Also, Russia still possesses about 35,000 tons of chemical agents and a huge biological weapons complex; and, there are tens of thousands of scientists, engineers, and others who once worked in the Soviet weapons of mass destruction (WMD) complex who are now unemployed or underemployed.³

Since the proliferation of former Soviet WMD is a security threat to the entire world, it is appropriate that this problem be addressed by an international coalition. An encouraging step in this process was the agreement of the G-8 leaders in June 2002 to create a “Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.” The G-8 leaders agreed to “support specific cooperation, initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues.” To those ends, the G-8 countries committed to “raise up to \$20 billion... over the next ten years.”⁴ The U.S. stated that it “intends to provide half that total.”⁵

This \$20 billion figure, if provided, would represent an increase over total worldwide spending on non-proliferation programs at present. However, the G-8 agreement proposes devoting to those purposes only two-thirds of the resources that the

Baker-Cutler Task Force suggested. Moreover, the U.S. portion would amount to a slight reduction in the U.S. effort compared to projecting the FY 2003 budget for programs focused on the former Soviet Union (FSU) alone out over the 10-year period and adjusting it for inflation. In addition, there are a number of other issues that must be addressed to ensure that the G-8 effort lives up to its full potential, including: ensuring access to Russian WMD facilities, coordinating amongst the various countries involved in the G-8 effort, and removing duties on items assisting threat reduction in the former Soviet Union. That said, if these issues can be worked through, the G-8 Global Partnership has the potential to contribute measurably to improved U.S. and global security.

II. Recent Legislation

N/A

III. Obstacles

- The G-8 Global Partnership does not include a mechanism for coordinating the efforts of the various countries, which can result in problems such as misplaced priorities, duplicative or inconsistent efforts, gaps in programs, and a failure to learn from the experiences of others.⁶ The absence of such a mechanism compounds the lack of central direction and coordination of the various U.S. government programs, as well as those of our allies.
- The U.S. and other countries funding non-proliferation efforts have at times had difficulty gaining access to sites where threat reduction work is occurring. There have also been problems regarding duties on equipment being brought into Russia for non-proliferation projects, taxes on the funds involved and payments to local personnel and contractors, and the extent of the protection of the funding countries' personnel and contractors from liability arising from the performance of the projects. Negotiations with funding countries need to resolve these issues at all levels of government.
- Not much of the \$10 billion from countries other than the U.S. that was pledged has been expended. France and Italy in particular have spent very little of the money they committed.⁷ Luckily, many non-G8 countries have made pledges, including Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, and several European countries.⁸

IV. Q & A

Q: What are the countries included in the G-8?

A: The G7 countries—the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan—plus Russia.

Q: How much of the “up to \$20 billion” G8 goal has been pledged?

A. In addition to the \$10 billion that the US has said it intended to provide, pledges totaling approximately \$5.312 billion have been made, as follows: Germany, \$1.5 billion;

UK, \$750 million; Canada, \$743 million; Italy, \$1.21 billion; Japan, \$200 million; and France, \$909 million. In addition, Russia itself⁹ has pledged \$2 billion; and the European Union and several other countries have made pledges or contributions totaling about \$1.42 billion.¹⁰

Q: Is the \$10 billion pledged by the United States “new” money or does it take into consideration other threat reduction programs already funded?

A: All of the United States’ ongoing programs over the next ten years count towards the 10 billion total. It is troubling that this may well end up in a net decrease in the amount the U.S. spends on these important programs.¹¹

V. Talking Points

- By greatly increasing international cooperation, the G-8 Global Partnership has the potential to considerably reduce the WMD threat.
- In February 2002, the CIA reported that “undetected smuggling has occurred” from Russian nuclear facilities.
- In October 2001, the U.S. government became concerned that al Qaeda may have smuggled a 10-kiloton nuclear warhead into New York City. Placed in a metropolitan area, such a device—small by U.S. and Russian standards—would probably kill 250,000 people, seriously injure tens of thousands more, and render a large area uninhabitable for decades to come.
- Securing the Russian nuclear arsenal is the cheapest, safest, and easiest solution to the current insecurity of the Russian nuclear complex.
- The G-8 Global Partnership, if successful in the former Soviet Union, might begin work to reduce the WMD threat outside of the FSU.

VI. Factoids

- Russia possesses 95 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons and materials outside of the United States.
- Russia devotes approximately 3.3 percent the amount of resources that the United States does to ensuring that nuclear weapons and materials do not proliferate.

VII. Applicable Treaties, Legislation, and Other International Agreements

- The G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, enacted at the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, is a commitment on the part of the international community to expend funds to secure weapons of mass destruction in the FSU and elsewhere.¹²

- The G-8 Global Partnership Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects, which outlines basic elements to be incorporated into legal frameworks for implementation, was negotiated in response to difficulties in implementing government-to-government agreements with the Russian Federation.
- Each year, the Congress enacts a National Defense Authorization Act, providing authorizations of appropriations to help Russia scale down its massive WMD complex and re-employ that state's weapon scientists. These programs work to ensure that weapons, materials, and expertise from Russia do not fall into the hands of terrorists or terrorist states.
- Presidents Bush and Putin signed the "U.S.-Russia Joint Fact Sheet: Bratislava Initiatives" in February 2005, encouraging nuclear security and counterterrorism cooperation.¹³

¹ Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, "A Report Card on the Department of Energy's Non-proliferation Programs with Russia," Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, co-chairs, Russia Task Force, January 10, 2001, accessed at: <http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/rusrpt.pdf>.

² Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, *Securing the Bomb 2005*, available at: http://www.nti.org/e_research/report_cnmupdate2005.pdf.

³ Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Russia Profile: Introduction," and "Russia Profile: Chemical Overview," November 2005, accessed at: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Russia/index.html and http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Russia/Chemical/index.html

⁴ Statement by the Group of Eight Leaders, "The G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction," Kananaskis, Canada, June 27, 2002, accessed at: http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/Art%2002%20gp_stat-en.pdf.

⁵ White House, "Fact Sheet: G-8 Summit -Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," accessed at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020627-7.html>.

⁶ The G8 countries have established a Senior Group (formerly the Senior Officials Group) as well as an expert-level Global Partnership Working Group in order to provide some coordination of Global Partnership activities. Ultimately, however, the projects and priorities reflect the goals of the individual funding countries. Strengthening the Global Partnership, "Global Partnership Basics," accessed at <http://www.sgpproject.org/resources/GPbasics.html>.

⁷ Testimony of Michele Flournoy, Senior Adviser for International Security, Center for Strategic and International Studies, before the House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, June 30, 2005, accessed at http://www.house.gov/international_relations/itnhear.htm.

⁸ Many of the challenges facing the G-8 effort are discussed in: "Assistant Secretary of State for Non-proliferation John Wolf Provides Details on G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction," interview by Leonard Spector, CNS- Monterey Institute of International Studies, accessed at: <http://www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020909.htm>.

⁹ There is disagreement within the Global Partnership donor group as to whether Russia's pledge of \$2 billion should count toward the overall \$20 billion goal. The U.S. and Russian governments believe it should not. See the Russia-specific material in Strengthening the Global Partnership, "Donor Fact Sheet," accessed at <http://www.sgpproject.org/Donor%20Factsheets/Russia.html>.

¹⁰ Strengthening the Global Partnership, "Donor Fact Sheet," accessed at <http://www.sgpproject.org/Donor%20Factsheets/Index.html>.

¹¹ Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 9, 2002, Kenneth N. Luongo, Executive Director, Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, accessed at: http://www.ransac.org/Official%20Documents/U.S.%20Congress/Hearings%20and%20Testimony/2002/100902_sfrc_testimony.html

¹² Statement by the Group of Eight Leaders, “The G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” *op. cit.*

¹³ The White House, “U.S.-Russia Joint Fact Sheet: Bratislava Initiatives,” February 24, 2005, accessed at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050224-7.html>